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Abstract 
 
We apply a recently suggested econometric approach to measure the effects of active labor market 
programs on employment, unemployment, and wage histories among participants. We find that 
participation in most of these training programs produces an initial locking-in effect and for some 
even a lower transition rate from unemployment to employment upon completion. Most programs, 
therefore, increase the expected duration of unemployment spells. However, we find that the 
training undertaken while unemployed successfully increases the expected duration of subsequent 
spells of employment for many sub-populations. These longer spells of employment come at a cost 
of lower accepted hourly wage rates.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper is concerned with uncovering effects of publicly subsidized training programs for the 
unemployed using observational data. Recent research within this area has documented the pivotal 
importance of aligning labor force dynamics of participants and potential controls in the period 
leading up to the participation decision for credibly uncovering causal relationships using such kind 
of data, see Heckman et al. (1998) and Heckman & Smith (1999). In this paper we will use the 
identification strategy that has been dubbed timing of events, see Abbring & van den Berg (2003): 
The idea here is to directly align the hazards out of unemployment among treated and controls and 
then use (conditional) randomness at the moments at which training is initiated over these spells of 
unemployment to uncover the causal effects training has on outcomes. 
 
We extend the econometric framework of Abbring & van den Berg (2003) in dimensions 
appropriately suited for the kind of programs we evaluate. We consider generic training programs 
and decompose and evaluate the effects of participation in multiple dimensions, all highly relevant 
and easily interpretable within an economic model of optimal job search behavior. Specifically, we 
estimate jointly the effect that participation in training has on transition out of unemployment while 
the training takes place1, the effect on the transition rate out of unemployment after completion, the 
effect it has on the length of subsequent spells of employment, and the impact that training will 
have on accepted wage rates. That is, we will use an extended multivariate duration model in which 
the inflow into different kinds of training programs, the outflow from unemployment, the accepted 
                                                 
1 In this respect, we model training as a sub-spell of the unemployment spell, as opposed to Gritz (1993), Ham & 
LaLonde (1996), and Bonnal et al. (1997) who all model participation in training as distinct labor market states – see 
discussion on this below. 
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hourly wage rate, and the outflow from subsequent employment are specified and allowed to 
interact jointly. As mentioned above, the idea underlying identification in our model is to use the 
randomness at which the spells of training are initiated and combine this with both pre- and post-
program durations. With this information, and the assumption that the different transition processes 
can be modeled jointly as mixed proportional hazards, the model is identified without the need of 
unpalatable exclusion restrictions. Intuitively, information on the correlations between unobserved 
heterogeneity components in the different labor market states and the earnings potentials among the 
agents can be obtained from the durations of these states and the observed wage rates. Because we 
model the unobservables explicitly, this method will give an estimate of the treatment effect taking 
into account that both observables and unobservables may determine the processes. It is important 
already at this point to explicitly notice that even with access to experimental data, where the 
selection into training is exogenously manipulated, we would still be forced to rely on these non-
experimental approaches in order to estimate the interdependent effects just outlined, see Ham & 
LaLonde (1996) and Card & Hyslop (2005). 
 
We focus on training programs introduced on a large scale to the unemployed in the Danish labor 
market in 1994, where improving job prospects of the unemployed were considered as the main 
aim. In fact, the programs were introduced on such a large scale that today Denmark (or Sweden 
depending on how it is measured) is the country in Europe that spends most money on active labor 
market policy as a share of GDP. In the light of this Kluve & Schmidt (2002) in a recent review of 
active labor market programs (ALMPs) in Europe, highlight Denmark as the prime example among 
European countries performing the transition from a benefit system of passive measures to one of 
active measures. These authors also conclude that many European ALMPs have been introduced 
without any prior knowledge about their effects, and they make a call for independent evaluations to 
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play a more important role in the implementation of the programs. The purpose of this paper will 
therefore also be to contribute with a thorough evaluation of the Danish large-scale system of 
ALMPs2. Specifically, using a 10 percent random draw of the Danish population with detailed 
information on individuals’ labor market states collected on a weekly basis in administrative 
registers, we evaluate and determine the effects of the different programs as compared to an 
outcome in which they had continued in 'open' unemployment without intervention. In this paper we 
test whether the unemployed were helped in getting back to work by these new ALMPs, whether 
the programs helped the participants in keeping their jobs, and whether participants were able to 
earn higher wages once they got back on the labor market; that is, we evaluate the effects of the 
programs in terms of expected unemployment duration, expected employment duration, and 
expected hourly wage rate.  
 
The model applied assumes the existence of a common treatment effect. In the light of recent 
studies on the heterogeneity of effects of training programs this assumption is clearly not 
innocuous. We therefore estimate our full-blown model on stratified sub-samples of our data to 
investigate the robustness of the results with respect to heterogeneity in outcomes. Specifically, we 
investigate impacts of training across gender, four different levels of education, and for five 
different age cohorts. 
 
                                                 
2 It is important to stress that we focus on direct effects of the different programs. No attempt is made to evaluate any 
general equilibrium effects of these programs. In fact, such effects will be assumed away. 
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The proportional hazard model and the recent timing-of-events method have been used in a number 
of studies before in connection with the evaluation of government-sponsored training programs3. 
The first study that we are aware of is Gritz (1993) who model training, non-employment, and 
employment as three distinct states using observational data from NLSY. Here it is found that 
private training programs increased the duration of subsequent spells of employment among women 
and as such is considered successful whereas the result for men was more ambiguous in that both 
the duration of subsequent employment and non-employment spells increased. The result from the 
public training programs is negative for both men and women, as the duration of the employment 
spells decreased after participation. Ham & LaLonde (1996) use experimental data on women from 
the NSW Demonstration combined with the hazard modeling approach and find that this program, 
as for the similar private training programs for women in Gritz (1993) worked through an increase 
in the duration of subsequent employment spells. Using the same setting as in Ham & LaLonde 
(1996), Eberwein et al. (1997) evaluate classroom training (CT) participation for women in the 
JTPA study and find that this type of training works through an increase in the transition rate out of 
unemployment and that the training has no effect on subsequent spells of employment. Bonnal et al. 
(1997) evaluate the effect of French training programs among young and unskilled male workers, 
and find that private job training work through an increase in the intensity at which participants 
leave subsequent spells of unemployment, whereas the opposite is the case for the effects of public 
job training. Common to these studies is that they all rely on retrospective information on labor 
force states collected from surveys and therefore rely on people’s notoriously poor ability and 
willingness to recollect and report the exact timing of incidences, information obviously crucial in 
                                                 
3 Of course, the list of references here is by no means exhaustively covering the area of program evaluation. See 
Heckman et al. (1999), Martin & Grubb (2001), and Kluve & Schmidt (2002) for recent extensive surveys of studies of 
program effects in general.  
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these kinds of studies. Moreover, both Gritz (1993) and Bonnal et al. (1997) aggregate selection 
across training programs such that a subsequent inference of differences in the workings of the 
training programs becomes confounded with the differences in the selection processes governing 
them.  
 
In Richardson & van den Berg (2001), Swedish vocational classroom training programs are 
evaluated for the entire population of participants using the timing-of-events method on the 
transition out of unemployment. Here, as will be the case below, training is modeled as a sub-spell 
of the ongoing spell of unemployment, and not as a separate state as in the above-mentioned 
studies. Not surprisingly given the nature of classroom training programs, participation results in a 
lowering of the transition rate out of unemployment while ongoing, the so-called locking-in effect, 
whereas the subsequent or what could be termed post-program effect on the transition rate is 
positive, such that the resulting overall net effect on the individual’s unemployment duration is 
about zero. The present paper has most in common with Lalive et al. (2002) and Bolvig et al. (2003) 
in that they evaluate entire systems of ALMPs. Lalive et al. (2002) study the effects of training 
programs, employment programs and wage subsidy programs in Switzerland and, with the 
exception of temporary wage subsidies to foreign males, find no positive effects on the job finding 
rate. Compared to the Danish ALMPs the Swiss system is of much smaller extent. Bolvig et al. 
(2003) evaluate active social policy in a large Danish municipality. The programs at study are 
employment and training measures offered to unemployed non-insured workers, non-workers, 
disabled and persons with other social problems. The employment measures have a positive net 
effect on the job finding rate while there is a negative effect of training measures. 
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The results found in this paper highlight the relevance of considering effects of training 
participation in multiple dimensions: effects of training on subsequent employment duration and 
wages should also be taken into account, since these effects for some subgroups are more important 
and unambiguous than the effects of training on unemployment durations. Concerning the latter 
impact we typically find evidence of locking-in effects, that is, while participation takes place, the 
cost of search obviously increases and the participants have a lower transition rate into regular 
employment. This effect is sometimes counteracted by positive post-program effects, but overall the 
programs do not have any quantitatively important effects on expected unemployment durations 
increasing these by weeks or perhaps a month only. An important exception is a category of 
residual programs – essentially a mixture of training and educational programs directed towards a 
weaker group of workers – that have prolonging effects on unemployment duration ranging up to 
half a year depending on sub-population.  
 
Turning to the effects of participation on the expected duration of subsequent spells of employment 
there is a clear prolonging impact from participation in private on-the-job training (OJT), while the 
opposite is true for participants in public OJT. In this respect, the results from our study are in full 
accordance with the results found in Gritz (1993) and Ham & LaLonde (1996) outlined above. We 
find that those with low levels of formal skills, the group of youths, and those with only low levels 
of initial education gain from participation in ordinary CT in terms of increases in expected 
employment duration. The same is also true for the group with potential obsolete formal skills 
namely the subgroup of people above 50; there appears to be no impact on employment duration 
from participation for the remaining sub-populations at all, rather depressing results in this respect, 
but fully in line with what was found in Eberwein et al. (1997). Turning to the residual group of 
training programs, which were found to have a negative effect in terms of unemployment duration, 
 8
we find that the impact from participation on the employment duration is often sufficiently positive 
to render the overall attachment to the labor market positive.  
 
Finally, the effect of training participation on the subsequent hourly wage rate is relatively 
unambiguous; typically wages are reduced by 3-7 percent. It is important to note here, though, that 
we do not consider the effect of participation on overall labor earnings. The estimated negative 
effect on the hourly wage rate might to a large extent be offset by the higher attachment to the labor 
market in terms of employability. For recent studies where earnings are considered, see Gerfin et al. 
(2005), and Lechner et al. (2004).4 In sum, the results indicate that training, not surprisingly, takes 
time and tend to prolong the duration of unemployment and that participants in private OJT, 
ordinary CT, and the residual type of training subsequently have longer spells of employment as a 
consequence of participation, but attain this at the cost of a lower hourly wage rate. For public OJT 
the effects are found to be negative in all dimensions under study and as such the working of this 
part of the Danish active labor market system is no different from most other countries. One 
possible explanation as to why people continue to participate in this specific part of the ALMPs, 
would be that in a system such as the Danish with a mandatory or workfare aspect, this type of 
program perhaps has the lowest effort cost among the choices available to the unemployed and as 
such participation in public OJT sends a negative signal to future potential employers that would 
otherwise have been unobserved. For a discussion of issues of signaling effects of programs see 
Gerfin et al. (2005). 
  
                                                 
4 The results and discussions in these references also highlight the importance of considering long-run effects of 
programs with aims at augmenting human capital among participants and that one can end up drawing very different 
policy conclusion when not only transitions out of unemployment is considered, but also the effect of employment is 
taken into account. 
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To sum up, in the paper we evaluate the effects of ALMPs offered to unemployed members of UI 
funds in Denmark between 1995 and 2000 using highly accurate and detailed information on 
people’s labor force dynamics from administrative registers using a flow sample. The paper 
contributes to the international literature in both specific and general ways. First, it provides a wide 
range of new results on the effects of active labor market policies in Denmark and as such sheds 
important light on the effects of the programs from a country implementing these policies on a large 
scale. Second, it implements and extends new methodology to program evaluation. We argue that 
the extensions we make will be of significant importance when performing studies of this kind and 
that incorporation of our suggestions might very well change the conclusions when assessing the 
successfulness of these policies. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 contains our 
data description along with information about the institutional environment. In section 3 the 
econometric model is specified and assumptions needed for identification are stated and discussed. 
Results are presented in section 4, and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional Setting and Data Description 
 
The 1994 reform of the Danish unemployment insurance system had several elements. First, the 
possibility for unemployed to renew eligibility for benefit periods by participating in active labor 
market measures was abolished and, second, the maximum time for receiving benefits was 
gradually shortened from nine to four years. Moreover, the active labor market measures were 
strengthened such that in principle, the benefit entitlements were made conditional on participation 
in training programs after an initial period in ‘open’ unemployment. This time until participation in 
ALMPs has been advanced gradually since, such that after 1999 the unemployed are in principle 
obliged to participate after one year of unemployment. Once this period of unconditional benefits 
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has expired the unemployed must participate in ALMPs during 75 percent of further time spent in 
unemployment5. Finally, the reform introduced individual training plans with the purpose of 
targeting the training effort towards the needs of the unemployed and the local labor markets.  
 
A host of different programs are available to the unemployed with the three most important ones 
being CT, public and private OJT, see Table 1 below. Participants in (most often vocational) CT 
will get their UI-benefits while participating6, whereas participants in OJT will receive the centrally 
negotiated minimum wage while participating. Participation will therefore increase earnings with up 
to 25 percent in OJT compared to staying on UI. Moreover, the firm taking in the unemployed for 
job training will get refunding equivalent to the maximum UI benefit level as well as subsidies to 
mentors and potential equipment needed for the training. Participation in OJT is meant to result in 
an upgrade of the professional and technical skill base and facilitate a general rehabilitation to the 
labor market. The remaining programs are targeted towards weaker groups of unemployed ‘who are 
having difficulties finding jobs or job training under regular circumstances with respect to wages 
and working conditions’ and will generally entail a stronger component of basic education. These 
will be pooled into one residual program for apparent computational reasons in the econometric 
analysis below. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
                                                 
5 After a reform in 2002 the unemployed are no longer required to participate in training programs for 75 percent of the 
time after the first year of unemployment. Instead, they are required to participate in a program every time they have 
had six consecutive months of unemployment. 
6 Those below the age of 25 receive half of maximum UI benefits. 
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The proportion of the unemployed participating in the programs has more than doubled since the 
first reform in 1994. This is partly due to the aforementioned strengthening of active measures, and 
partly due to the fact that the reforms also entailed forward shifts in the active period such that more 
people are affected by the requirements of the activation. In the period 1995-1999 the number of 
yearly fulltime persons participating in some ALMP rose from nearly 45,000 to almost 55,000. 
After this the number declined to around 42,000 in 2001. In the same period the number of 
unemployed persons declined steadily from 288,000 to 145,000. It is worth noticing that an 
extensive use of leave schemes was introduced in this period, withdrawing a lot of people from the 
unemployment statistics.  Most important for the interpretation of our results below, was the 
possibility for long termed unemployed (defined as those having been unemployed for at least 12 
months out of the previous 15 months) 50-59-year-olds to withdraw permanently from the labor 
market in 1994 and 1995. This temporarily introduced scheme was in fact so lucrative that more 
than 50,000 unemployed in the relevant age group took advantage of the program and retired early. 
Comparing this figure with our ten percent random sample of above 50-year-old unemployed 
workers in subsequent years (1995-2000) being that of little less than 20,000, see below, we 
conclude that the program was indeed very popular, see Bingley et al. (2004) for further discussions 
of this retirement program.  
 
There has also been a shift in the composition of how the different types of training programs have 
been used, see Table 1. In 1995 30 percent of all participants enrolled in ordinary CT, while this 
percentage has risen to 65 in 2000. At the same time, the proportion of those participating in private 
OJT was more than halved from 14 to 6 percent, while the share of participants in public OJT fell 
from 31 to 15 percent.  
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The duration of private job training programs is on average shorter than those in the public sector. 
Table 2 shows that among the programs initiated in 1996 private OJT on average had a duration of 
22 weeks while public OJT lasted 39 weeks. Ordinary CT lasted on average 28 weeks, while the 
entrepreneurship subsidy and employment programs had a considerably longer duration.  
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
To illustrate the variation in the time until participation Figure 1 plots the (unconditional) Kaplan-
Meier hazard rates into each of the four program types. It is evident that the unemployed select into 
the different programs from very early on in their unemployment spells despite the fact that 
participation only becomes compulsory much later on (no earlier than one year during this period, 
see above).7 However, the unemployed are also required by law to be available for potential work 
and the initiation of some of the programs in the early months of the unemployment spells might be 
the result of caseworkers placing the unemployed in programs as tests of the willingness to work. A 
similar picture is found in other countries with compulsory participation components; see e.g. 
Gerfin et al. (2005) for the case of Switzerland. Moreover, whereas the two OJT – programs and the 
residual category of training programs (with hazard rate indistinguishable from public OJT) exhibit 
a flat profile over the first two years of unemployment, the hazard into CT shows an increasing 
trend, although estimated on an ever decreasing pool of potential participants (right scale). This 
latter picture should be kept in mind when assessing the results of this program below. I.e. CT 
might very well work as an instrument among caseworkers for meeting the placement requirements 
among the otherwise difficult-to-place clients with potential sub-optimal outcomes as a result. But, 
again, with weekly hazards below two percent from less than five percent of the initial pool of 
                                                 
7 The Kaplan-Meier hazards (left scale) are calculated as number of weekly entrants into the four different programs 
over the pool of potential entrants, namely those still unemployed who have not yet entered one of the programs – i.e., 
the survivors (right scale). 
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entrants into unemployment (cf. the estimated survivor function), the number of relevant persons 
affected by the estimated impacts is negligible. It is evident from Figure 1 that the largest chunck of 
entry into programs takes place in the first 30 weeks. This is seen by simply multiplying the 
empirical hazards with the fraction of survivors (bold). With the identification strategy we pursue 
below – a common proportional effect across the spell – these early entrants into the programs will 
weigh the most. For issues on differences in effects with respect to initiation of programs over the 
duration of unemployment, see Gerfin et al. (2005). 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Unemployed participating in the four training programs differ with respect to observable 
background characteristics as is evident from Table 3. Here it is seen that unemployed in public 
OJT are on average slightly older than the remaining three groups; around two thirds are women 
and they have relatively short education. As opposed to this, participants in private OJT are more 
often males, are to a larger extent skilled, and have a slightly lower benefit replacement rate. The 
group participating in CT is different in that they are relatively well educated and they are more 
often women. The group participating in the residual type of training programs is characterized by 
having a low fraction of married participants, and the majority has less than 5 years of labor market 
experience. Thus, there are differences in the personal characteristics across the program 
participants, although these are not particularly pronounced. 
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TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The data set we use above and in the econometric analysis below is a 10 percent random sample of 
entrants into unemployment in the years 1995 to 2000.8 The data is a longitudinal data set with 
detailed information of the individual's labor market states along with information on individual 
socio-economic characteristics. The socio-economic variables are extracted from the integrated 
database for labor market research (IDA) and the income registers in Statistics Denmark. For 
individuals in our sample event histories are created, such that we are able to identify every 
person’s labor market state in any week during the years. That is, we know whether the individuals 
are employed, unemployed, participating in ALMPs, or out of the labor force. The hourly wage rate 
is calculated from annual labor earnings and number of working hours. The measure of working 
hours used in this calculation is very precise in that this information comes from registers on 
compulsory contributions to supplemental pension payments that are closely linked to the working 
hours actually paid for by employers. Our sample consists of all UI fund members between 19 and 
66 years of age in the period of 1995-2000. Individuals having participated in any program prior to 
1995 are excluded from our evaluation and only the treatment effect of the first program in this 
period is evaluated. Observations with more than one spell of training participation are censored at 
the time of entry into the second program spell. 
  
In the sample there are 102,411 individuals who share among them nearly 470,000 employment, 
training, and unemployment spells over the period. Of these spells 17,978 are ALMP spells and 
269,777 are employment spells. 
 
                                                 
8 We do not evaluate the reform from its initiation in 1994 because of data recording problems in this first year. 
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The demographic characteristics that we condition on are age group dummies, gender, marital 
status, dummies for the presence of children, citizenship, and city size. These variables are found in 
the literature to be of great importance in determining both employability, but also the probability of 
taking training. For example, women with family responsibilities because of dependent children are 
supposedly less likely to engage in training as the perceived opportunity costs are higher.  Attained 
education is captured by dummies for basic schooling, high school and further education with 
vocational education as reference. Again, these variables are also of great importance in 
determining both the duration of unemployment and employment, as well as predicting training 
participation and expected wage rates. Labor market experience since 1964 is included, and we also 
include the rate with which UI benefits replace the latest observed wage rate. This rate has a 
relatively high ceiling of 90 percent. A dummy for membership of a trade union is included, and the 
type of previous industry is also controlled for by inclusion of nine industry specific UI fund 
membership dummies. We capture business cycle effects by including dummies for the year in 
which the spells are initiated. Finally, we include an indicator for the remaining weeks of UI 
benefits the unemployed had at the beginning of the unemployment spell. This variable is defined as 
the difference between the maximum number of weeks with benefits minus the individuals UI 
seniority at the beginning of the spell. The UI seniority is the number of weeks the unemployed 
previously were unemployed and received UI benefits. In 1995 UI seniority was reset whenever the 
individual had been employed for 26 weeks, but this requirement was strengthened to 52 weeks by 
January 1997. The maximum number of weeks with benefits was gradually shortened from nine to 
four years during the 1990s (see discussion above), and this means that the number of weeks 
remaining with benefits is reduced each time the maximum time limit is shortened. 
 
3. Econometric Model 
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This section gives a description of the econometric method we use for identification of treatment 
effects and how the self selection into ALMPs is controlled for. The main problem is how to 
calculate the effect of treatment of those treated compared to a state, where they were not treated; 
the problem of construction counterfactuals. It is not straightforward to create a suitable control 
group in the Danish labor market, as all unemployed in principle have to participate in a training 
program at some point in time, should they stay unemployed long enough. Thus, late in the 
unemployment spells there are few or no non-participants to compare with. 
 
We solve this problem of constructing counterfactuals by use of the already mentioned timing-of- 
events methodology of Abbring & van den Berg (2003). The method exploits the variation in the 
starting dates of the different types of programs over the unemployment spells, cf. figure 1. Some 
unemployed are participating early in their spells, and therefore unemployed individuals, not yet 
participating in ALMPs, can be used as comparison group over this time interval. If the effect of 
participation is assumed constant irrespective of when it is initiated over the unemployment spell, 
then the relevant counterfactual for unemployed participating in programs at later stages in their 
unemployment spell is deducted. In this way a hazard rate for a hypothetical non-participant is 
derived, and so the effects of program participation can be calculated.  
 
In what follows a duration model is specified, where effects of personal characteristics on the exit 
rate out of a specific labor market state are obtained. The labor market states under consideration 
are unemployment, employment, and duration until program participation. Following Abbring & 
van den Berg (2003) participation in a program is seen as a part of the unemployment spell, and is 
not considered a separate state. That is, the unemployed are observed in the states of unemployment 
and pre-training participation at the same time, and the exit rates for these states are modeled and 
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estimated simultaneously. Time until participation is modeled as competing risks hazards, where the 
different destinations (“risks”) are the four different types of programs; private OJT, public OJT, 
CT, and the residual category. So compared to Gritz (1993) or Bonnal et al. (1997), who aggregate 
selection across different states, we explicitly allow for selection into treatments to vary with 
treatment program. This is accomplished by letting the selection parameters vary freely between our 
different programs and by allowing for unobservables affecting these selection mechanisms to be 
correlated across types of training. Furthermore, to investigate effects of ALMP participation on the 
duration of subsequent employment and earnings potentials, the exit rate out of this state and hourly 
wage rate is also estimated.  
 
The model explicitly takes into account the self selection into the different ALMPs. The selection 
that occurs based on observed characteristics is accounted for by using these variables as 
explanatory factors affecting the competing risks hazard rates into the programs proportionally. On 
top of this, selection based on unobservables is, under strict assumptions, also possible, as no 
measures for e.g. ability or motivation are available, and unobserved administrative selection of 
participants into programs may also take place. The econometric model accommodates for 
unobservables in the selection process and in the outcome process as outlined below.  
 
Let the continuously distributed random variable T denote the duration of a given labor market 
state. The hazard rate, which is the probability that individuals with given observed and unobserved 
characteristics, x andν, exit a given state in the period t+dt conditional on being in the state until 
time t, is then given by 
 
 ( ) ( )
0
Pr , , ν
, lim
dt
t T t dt T t
t
dt
θ ν
→
< ≤ + >
=
x
x . (1) 
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The hazard functions in this paper are specified as mixed proportional hazards, i.e. the functions are 
products of baseline hazards and functions of observed characteristics, x, and unobserved 
characteristics, ν, 
 
 ( ) ( ), ν ( ) , νt tθ λ ϕ= ⋅x x . (2) 
  
λ(t) is the baseline hazard and φ(x,ν) is the systematic part defined as exp(xβ+ν). The baseline 
hazard is specified as a piecewise constant function, i.e. λ(t) = exp(αm), m =1,…,M, where M is the 
number of baseline segments to be estimated.  
 
Three important assumptions are imbedded more or less explicit in the specification of (2). Firstly, 
as we estimate the baseline, λ(t), as a piecewise constant hazard, we are in effect letting the data 
guide us in how the hazard behave over time. But it is also important to notice that no immediate 
behavioral interpretation can be given to these estimated coefficients, see e.g. Lancaster (1990) or 
the recent survey of duration models in van den Berg (2001). Secondly, we assume that the effects 
of explanatory variables are proportional to the baseline hazards and hence do not vary across the 
duration of the states. As noted in both Lancaster (1990) and van den Berg (2001) this functional 
form restriction has little or no economic-theoretical justification, but is nevertheless almost always 
invoked in empirical duration analysis. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the inclusion of 
unobserved heterogeneity, most often in these types of models interpreted as unobserved cognitive 
ability, motivation, or self-discipline, has (besides being one-dimensional or scalar) to be 
stochastically independent of the included observed characteristics, x at the time of the inflow into 
the relevant spell. In practice this means that if the interpretation of v as, say, ability is entertained, 
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then the distribution of ability has to be identical among observed high achievers, i.e. highly 
educated, high earners with lots of labor market experience, as among low achievers, i.e. poorly 
educated, low earners with marginal attachment to the labor market. Moreover, this assumption is in 
sharp contrast to the program evaluation literature of matching. Here it is typically assumed that the 
correlation between unobserved components such as motivation or job-readiness and observed 
covariates such as labor market history and attained education, is high enough to render program 
participation conditional independent of outcomes; see Lechner (1999, 2000, 2002a, 2002b), Gerfin 
& Lechner (2002), or Gerfin et al. (2005) for this line of argumentation. 
 
Considering first the hazard rate of the transitions from unemployment to employment9 we use as 
part of the observed characteristics time varying indicator variables for whether the unemployed is 
participating in training and whether one such training spell is completed. a(tu) is a 4×1 dummy 
vector that takes on the value 1 if the person participates in a given type of training at time t. c(tu) is 
a 4×1  dummy vector indicating whether the unemployed has completed one of the four different 
programs prior to time t. I.e. the hazard rate for an unemployment spell (u) can be written as  
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ), , , , ( ), ( ),u u u u u u u u u u u u ut t t t t tθ ν λ ϕ ν= ⋅x a c x a c . (3) 
 
This specification lets us distinguish between two different effects of training participation on the 
duration of unemployment. Inclusion of the dummy vector a(tu) allows us to capture that the 
unemployed potentially alter (reduce) their search effort while participating in training. This effect 
is termed the locking in effect, should it be negative. However, nothing ex-ante would restrict us to 
                                                 
9 Only transitions from unemployment to employment and back are considered. Hence, transitions to other labor market 
states are treated as right censored. 
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allow these effects to be only negative. The vector c captures the post-training effect, which is 
positive if training enhances skills and thus employability of the participants. Again there might be 
countervailing effects if, for instance, participants narrow their search to jobs where skills acquired 
during participation are demanded. 
 
An illustration of potential effects is shown in Figure 2 below. Here we have a potential downward 
sloping unemployment hazard. At time t1 the unemployed enroll in labor market training causing a 
downward shift in the hazard. This may come from lower search intensity while participating as 
mentioned above. Once the program ends, at time t2, there is an upward shift in the hazard - in 
Figure 2, this shift is of a magnitude such that the rate out of unemployment is now higher than it 
would be had the unemployed not participated in the training program, i.e. there is a positive post-
training effect on the unemployment hazard. 
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The time until participation in training (a) is specified as a competing risks hazard model, i.e. there 
are four treatment-specific hazard rates for the four different kinds of training:  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), , , 1, 2,3,4,am am am am am am am am amt t mθ ν λ ϕ ν= ⋅ =x x  (4) 
 
which altogether gives the hazard rate 
  
 ( ) ( )4
1
, , ν ,a a a a ai ai ai ai
i
t tθ θ
=
=∑x ν x  (5) 
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where νa=(νa1,νa2,νa3,νa4)’. 
 
The duration of the employment spells (e) are specified in much the same way as the unemployment 
duration; 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), , , , ,e e e e e e e e et tθ ν λ ϕ ν= ⋅x c x c  (6) 
 
where we notice that c in (6) is not time varying over the employment spells, in that it just indicates 
what kind of training (if any) the individual previously has participated in. 
 
As already mentioned, a possible outcome of participation in training programs could be a 
prolonged duration of unemployment. This result need not be suboptimal from the viewpoint of the 
participating individual. In standard models of job search (see e.g. Mortensen (1977)) the 
unemployed may find it optimal to increase their reservation wage if individual productivity 
increases. That is, in our context training participants may find it optimal to increase their 
reservation wage in order to reap the rewards of a potentially augmented level of human capital. 
This may have a prolonging effect on unemployment duration, but also a higher wage rate when a 
job is accepted. To investigate this possibility we specify a standard wage equation, where the 
returns on labor depend on education and the amount of job training the individual may have: 
 
 ( )log w w ww uν= + + +x β c  (7) 
 
Now, xw is composed of variables potentially affecting productivity and hence wages. We augment 
the standard wage equation to include effects of the training programs, c. We let u be i.i.d. N(0,σu) 
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and the individual specific unobserved wage effects, νw, be correlated with the unobservables from 
the duration contributions, νu, νe, and νam, m=1,…,4. That is, we have assumed existence of 
unobserved (random effects-) components as in the other equations with two points of support in 
addition to the normally distributed error terms. With the unobserved component entering as a 
random effect we again need to invoke the assumption of independence between observed 
variables, xw, and the unobserved component, vw. Moreover, the effects of the different programs 
are assumed to enter the wage equation additively and hence as homogenous effects.  
 
The parameters of the model are estimated by maximum likelihood, and the contribution to the 
likelihood function from an unemployment spell is  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )0, ( ), ( ), , ( ), ( ), exp , ( ), ( ), ,uu tdu u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u ut t t t t t s s s dsν θ ν θ ν= ⋅ −∫x a c x a c x a c L  (8) 
 
where du takes the value 1, if the observation has ended with a transition to employment, and the 
value 0, if the observation is censored. The contribution from transitions into training to the 
likelihood becomes  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )4 ( ) 0
1
, , exp , ,amm am
ta t
a a a a am am am am a am a a am
m
t t s dsθ ν θ
=
= ⋅ −∏ ∫x ν x x νL  (9) 
 
where am(tam) takes the value 1 if the individual selects into training activity m at t and 0 otherwise. 
Employment spells contribute with  
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 ( ) ( ) ( )( )0, , , , exp , , ,ee tde e e e e e e e e e e e et t s dsν θ ν θ ν= ⋅ −∫x c x c x c L  (8) 
where de equals 1 if the individual is observed to return to unemployment, and 0 otherwise.  
 
We only observe w for those actually finding a job, du=1, hence the likelihood contribution from 
observed hourly wage rates is 
  
 ( )log udw w wwεφ ν= − − −xβ cL . (9) 
 
The unobserved heterogeneity terms are specified by the stochastic variables Vu, Va, Ve, and Vw, 
where Va consists of the four variables, Va1, Va2, Va3, and Va4. Hence, the complete likelihood 
function is  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , , , , ,
u a e w
u u u u a a a a e e e e w w w u a e wV V V
t t t dGν ν ε ν ν ν ν= ∫ ∫ ∫ ∫V x x ν x x νL  L L L L , (10) 
 
where G is the simultaneous CDF for the unobserved heterogeneity. The models are estimated 
under the assumption that the terms coming from the unobserved heterogeneity, Vj, j=u,a,e,w  
follow a two point distribution normalized such that Vj can take the values 0 and vj only. This means 
that 128 (=27) types may exist each with a corresponding probability. This assumption is discussed 
further in the results section below. 
 
An appropriate way to illustrate the effects of participation is to calculate the expected duration of a 
given baseline state, E[Y0], by integrating out both observables and unobservables. As the group of 
treated individuals is systematically different from those not participating (both in terms of 
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observables, but also in terms of unobservables), calculating E[Y0|d=m] requires us to back out the 
empirical distribution of unobservables among the treated sub-populations. 10 As the specification in 
(10) is a mixture model, the probability distribution of unobservables among the subgroup of treated 
conditional on observed labor market histories, Hi, and estimated parameters, Ψˆ , is given by 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
ˆˆ , ,ˆˆ , , ,
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ, , 1 , , 0
j i i i j j
i j j i i
j i i i j j u i i i j
H V v
p V v H
H V v H V
′ Ψ =
= Ψ =
′′ Ψ = + − Ψ =
π x
x
π x π x
 
   
L
L L
 (11) 
 
where ˆ 'jπ  denotes the 64 1× of the estimated unconditional probabilities of being a type vj and 
( )ˆ , ,i i i j jH V vΨ =x L  is the vector of conditional likelihood contributions evaluated at the estimated 
parameters Ψˆ . With the estimated conditional probabilities, we can calculate the differences in 
expected unemployment and employment durations because of program participation, and produce 
the standard parameter presented in the program evaluation literature, the Average Treatment Effect 
on the Treated 0 .mE Y Y d m⎡ ⎤− =⎣ ⎦  
 
Applying the timing of events framework to a study evaluating the Danish ALMPs would of course 
require that the system evaluated meets the assumptions necessary for identification of the effects. 
One such requirement is randomness in the time of entry into the different training programs 
conditional on the information set. As illustrated in figure 1, it is evident from the data that there is 
a high degree of variation in the time until entry, which may be due to different mechanisms. 
Administrative practices are known to differ across municipalities and within municipalities 
                                                 
10 We use the notation of the Roy-Rubin model extended to a situation with multiple programs which is by now 
standard and is taken from Lechner (2001). 
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variation may arise due to variation in the starting dates of programs and randomness, from the 
viewpoint of the unemployed, certainly arrive in private job training programs depending upon 
cooperation of participating firms. 
 
As emphasized by Abbring & van den Berg (2003) a behavioral assumption required for valid use 
of the timing of events method is that the unemployed do not anticipate the exact date of entry into 
training. If anticipation effects are present then the unemployed may alter their search intensity for 
jobs and the treatment effects may be biased. However, anticipation effects are not to be confused 
with ex ante effects of training. That is, the unemployed are allowed to act according to the 
knowledge that there is a probability of training enrollment in the future. A thorough discussion of 
this issue is given in Richardson & van den Berg (2002). If, as is typically the case in Denmark, 
participants are only notified a few weeks in advance of the first day of the training programs, then 
anticipation effects are limited and the treatment effects tend to be unbiased, it is argued. 
 
An important source of anticipation effects concerns enrollment in ordinary classroom training at 
dates which are given within the regular school system. In that case the starting date could coincide 
with the starting date of the school terms which is easier to anticipate. However, in the data the 
starting dates for training programs are fairly evenly spread during the year. For most weeks around 
two percent of the programs start, but there are typically a few weeks in January and September 
where enrollment is somewhat higher (up to five percent). This is probably to some extent catch up 
from low enrollment in previous weeks during summer and Christmas holidays (where the 
enrollment rate is below 0.5 percent). 
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It is clear that the assumption of no or limited anticipatory effect is fundamental to this study (and to 
any other study estimating causal relationships between ALMPs and labor market outcomes using 
non-experimental data in systems such as the Danish, where there is some compulsory component 
in the active labor market policies). With the data we have at hand right now, we as 
econometricians only observe the moment of actual participation and not what is essentially the real 
treatment (or at least part of it), namely the information shock (which of course cannot be 
anticipated). I.e. the real moment of treatment is the moment at which the information about the 
future participation arrives. Up until now the information concerning announcements has not been 
available in Denmark11. See also Black et al. (2003) on the threat effects of training. Finally, let us 
note, that interviews with caseworkers indicate that although so-called plan of actions are made 
between caseworkers and clients (the unemployed) within the first three to six months, the stated 
dates of program participation in these plans are only followed to a limited extent. A caseworker 
can, and is known to, call up clients on Fridays demanding them to show up in programs on 
Mondays. We stress that this is purely anecdotal evidence and future research should be able to cast 
light on the time from announcements to program start as well as the selection processes taking 
place in between. 
 
4. Results 
 
                                                 
11 However, the relevant information about dates of announcements has been recorded during the last couple of years in 
AMANDA (the system used by the caseworkers in Denmark) and in future work we intend to couple this information 
with the data we have already (or an updated and newer sample of the population). Doing this we will be able to 
quantify and assess the size and magnitude of any bias in the current estimates.  
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This section reports the results of estimating our model. To explore the possibility of program effect 
heterogeneity, we estimate the full model on 11 different sub-populations, namely men and women 
separately, five different age groups, and four different subgroups defined by educational 
attainment. We only show the treatment effects on unemployment, employment and wages, while 
the effects of personal characteristics as well as estimated baseline hazards are tabulated in our 
internet appendix. To allow for a flexible baseline hazard we have chosen 12 different pieces with 
varying lengths in the main unemployment and employment equations. For the competing risks into 
the four different training schemes we have chosen 10 pieces, again with different lengths.  
 
We first consider the effects of participation on unemployment duration. These estimated model 
parameters are not straightforward to compare to the ‘standard’ evaluation literature, so next we 
focus on the implied average treatment effects on the treated (ATET) – for the unemployment and 
employment by using the formula above. Finally, the treatment effects on the wage rate in 
subsequent employment are reported in section 4.5. Section 4.6 discusses sensitivity of results with 
respect to some specification issues. 
 
4.1 Unemployment duration and program participation 
 
Table 4 brings the estimated treatment effects during and after training participation for the 11 
different divisions of the sample. It is seen that the effects of public OJT and the residual training 
category are negative both during participation and afterwards. This is the case when partitioned 
into men and women, educational subgroups, and age groups. For example, for men after 
participation the hazard from unemployment to employment is only 73.7 percent of the hazard had 
the individuals not participated. The results give clear evidence of locking in effects and negative 
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post program effects when considering these two training schemes. Thus the programs are 
unambiguously prolonging the duration of unemployment for the participants with a downward 
shift in the hazard of more than 66 percent in some cases while participation takes place and 
between 10 and 35 percent afterwards! 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Private OJT, on the contrary, is seen to have a positive effect on the exit rate into employment while 
participating, i.e. no locking in is taking place12. This is probably to be explained by the fact that the 
participants in private job training tend to continue their jobs at the same employer under normal 
conditions. According to table 4, this effect is stronger for those in the higher age brackets, for 
persons having no formal education and for individuals with a vocational education. As opposed to 
this, the post-program effect of private OJT is negative for most groups. This means that those 
among the participants that do not go directly from the training program to employment are worse 
off compared to the case of no job training. I.e. there are indications that private OJT create skills 
which are not useful anywhere, but at the specific employer. The negative post program effects 
from private and public job training and for the residual program could be explained by a scenario 
where the unemployed having finished their programs narrow their job search to jobs where these 
newly acquired skills can be utilized. 
 
                                                 
12 Bear in mind, that we do not have information on the intended length of the programs. I.e. it could be that people 
either exit the programs (and thus unemployment) during participation or that they find regular employment 
immediately upon completion. This fact also limits our possibility of estimating effects of lengths and intensity of 
programs. 
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Ordinary classroom training is by far the most widely used ALMP, see figure 1 and table 1. Not 
surprisingly does classroom training give rise to the strongest locking-in effects with the hazard 
lowered in some cases by 75 percent. This indicates that the search intensity for jobs is severely 
reduced while participating in classroom training, such that the hazard rate out of unemployment is 
reduced. The post program effects of classroom training are found to be positive for only a few 
subgroups - the only program with positive post program effects on the unemployment hazard - but 
negative for youth. The positive effect is largest for women with the hazard out of unemployment 
up some 50 percent.  
 
4.2 Heterogeneity in baseline outcomes for standard persons 
 
We now turn our attention to calculation of treatment effects that are easier to compare with the 
‘standard’ evaluation literature. That is, in table 5 we report the calculated ATET, along with 
estimated baseline expected unemployment and employment durations for standard persons 
( )( )0E Y , the estimated baseline expected unemployment and employment durations for the groups 
who end up participating in the different programs, ( ) { }( )0 , 1, 2,3,4E Y d m m= = , and the 
respective sample sizes used in calculating these parameters. The calculations are based on 
estimated parameters from the full-blown model available in our internet appendix. We use the 
empirical or unconditional distribution of unobservables in calculating ( )0E Y  and the conditional 
distribution of unobservables among participants, see (11) above. To avoid extrapolating the 
expectations out in areas of too thin support, all durations are calculated over a seven-year-period 
only. The calculations are not too sensitive to this censoring, since most durations in our sample 
have a fairly limited range. 
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We first offer some comments on the heterogeneity in baseline outcomes for standard persons – see 
the first column of Table 5. Women in our sample are on average unemployed for 1½ months 
longer than the corresponding group of males (46 weeks compared to 39 weeks), but when they do 
find jobs they tend to keep them for longer period of time, around four months. This latter result 
may come from the fact that women are more likely to self-select into the public sector than males, 
where job protection is typically higher. Turning to the calculations based on the age-specific 
subgroups estimations, there is an increasing expected duration of unemployment over the 
subgroups; i.e. where a standard person below 25 years can expect to be unemployed for four 
months (21 weeks) the expected duration among those above 50 years is as high as 20 months. 
However, for the expected employment durations, the age profile is more concave with the young 
and older having expected durations around 3 years whereas individuals in their thirties are 
expected to stay employed for almost 4 years. 
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
There is not much difference in expected unemployment duration across the different educational 
groups, but somewhat surprisingly the expected employment duration among unskilled and those 
with a vocational education is more than four months higher than for the group with at least a 
college degree. The reason is a follows: Whereas estimated baseline hazards and the value of the 
estimated unobserved component in the employment equation, ˆev , are not substantially different 
across the sub-populations, the estimated probability of being a high type among employed (those 
with Ve=0, or low transition probabilities out of employment) is 50 percent high in the populations 
with lower educational levels (around 0.3) as among the college educated (0.20) driving this 
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peculiar result. It is important to stress here again that we base our estimation sample on the flow of 
people into unemployment. In this respect our results are not representative of the population of 
labor market participants as a whole; the average durations are almost certainly ‘worse’ than among 
the general working population in Denmark. 
 
4.3 Heterogeneity in baseline outcomes for participants 
 
The next set of results concerns heterogeneity in baseline outcomes for participants – see the first 
column for each of the for different program types. Comparing the differences in expected 
unemployment durations between the participants and the standardized ‘controls’, there appears to 
be a rather modest positive selection for the sub-classification groups of men and women into 
private OJT compared to the standard persons (34 weeks vs. 39, and 40 weeks vs. 46). For expected 
employment durations, it is evident that those who end up in e.g. the private OJT program have 
worse expected baseline outcomes, the differences being more than five months or some 15 percent.  
 
The picture for the nine sub-populations confirms and even strengthens the picture of a selection 
into private OJT taking place among unemployed with expected ‘poor’ baseline outcomes. It is only 
among high school and college graduates that there appears to be a positive selection into private 
OJT compared to the corresponding standard persons. The calculations among high school 
graduates are based on 56 observations only and should therefore be interpreted with much caution. 
Where we noted in the previous subsection that unemployed college graduates on average had 
poorer distribution of unobservables than their counterparts with vocational and basic education, we 
also note here that for the group of participating college graduates the estimated distribution of 
Ve=0 is more than twice as high among private OJT participants as in the population of controls. 
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The negative selection into public OJT is even more pronounced than for private OJT. It is seen that 
participants in public OJT often have up to two months longer expected baseline spells of 
unemployment coupled with shorter expected employment durations than the already ‘selected’ 
private counterparts. For the two remaining program types the same negative selection appears 
albeit not to the same extent as for public OJT.  Two notable differences are participants in ordinary 
class room training among those above 50 years and among those with only basic schooling level. 
Here the expected employment duration is even poorer than among publicly job trained in the 
absence of any program. Explanations for these selective differences are obsolete skills among the 
older workers and no formal qualifying exam among the latter group necessitating participation in 
the class room training program for those who would otherwise perform poorly on the labor market. 
 
4.4 Average program effects among participants 
 
The results in square brackets in Table 5 are the estimated ATET for the respective sub-groups. 
Turning first to the effects of private OJT, we see that despite a program participation period of six 
months there is hardly any prolonging effect on the expected duration of unemployment. For some 
groups the expected unemployment duration is even shortened; this is the case for the age group of 
25-29-year-olds, those above 50, and the subgroup with vocational education. The main effect 
comes from a positive effect on the transition probability from unemployment to employment while 
the programs take place as explained in section 4.1, i.e., participants probably tend to continue in 
their jobs at the same employer under normal conditions. It is also evident from the table that the 
two oldest sub-groups gain the most in terms of expected employment duration with more than 
eight months for those between 40 to 49 years and 1½ years for those above 50, while people below 
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30 are found to hardly gain anything. If ‘learning begets learning’ then this difference between the 
two age groups could come from the fact that those in their forties and fifties have more human 
capital accumulated over the years in the form of regular job training thus making it easier to 
benefit from the job training program. Another explanation could be that since the possibility for 
older workers to withdraw from the labor market in the mid-1990s in Denmark was rather lucrative 
and many workers in fact did leave, then those who ended up staying in the labor market were those 
more motivated and with an expected higher gain than their younger program participating 
counterparts. 
 
For public OJT the results are mostly depressing. Despite the already negative selection into this 
program, the effects of participation seem to be that of prolonging the unemployment spells up to 
almost 17 weeks (basic schooling). Moreover, once participants do find a job, they often end up 
keeping it for shorter periods as a result of participation in public OJT. The only group with an 
estimated positive employment outcome from this type of program is the subgroup of those above 
50 years who gain seven months in terms of employment. The program participation had a 
prolonging effect on the spell of unemployment of three months, however, leaving the overall or net 
effect only modestly positive. This latter deviating result, although at first surprising, could stem 
from the fact that the participants here are systematically more motivated than their younger 
counterparts because of the aforementioned outflux of less easily trained or that they end up in 
systematically different public jobs. 
 
For the ordinary CT program the effects are mostly as expected when it comes to unemployment 
duration. As shown in section 4.1 there is a significant locking in effect for all sub-populations 
under study, but most groups experience a positive post-program effect and among unemployed 
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with sufficiently long expected baseline unemployment durations (subgroup of women and older 
workers), the post-program effect is large enough to overcome the initial negative locking-in effect, 
such that the overall effect on expected unemployment duration is actually positive. With respect to 
the effects of class room training on the subsequent spells of employment, we see that those with 
low levels of human capital, the young and those with only initial basic schooling levels, gain up to 
21 weeks from participation or three times the size of the effect on unemployment. The only other 
group of unemployed who gain from participation in CT is, again, the older. 
 
Finally, the impacts of the residual group of programs are that of rather substantial prolonging of 
the expected duration of unemployment for all subgroups. Again, this is not surprising given the 
length and nature of these programs, see section 2. It only benefits few groups in terms of 
subsequent employability namely those with much labor market experience, women, and college 
educated. Only for the sub-population of participants above fifty is the employment effect large 
enough to more than match the initial negative effect on unemployment duration. 
 
4.5 Treatment effects on wage rates 
 
Turning to the last set of results – the effects of program participation on hourly wage rates – we 
find a remarkably consistent negative impact of ALMP participation, cf. Table 6. In summary, we 
see that men are punished harder than women; often more than twice as hard. Coupled with the 
evidence from Table 5, we conclude that participants in private job training experience an increase 
in employability, but at the cost of a lower hourly wage rate. This wage drop also applies to 
participants in public job training, but they were also found to have lower expected employment 
duration. The youth were found to be the only group to benefit from ordinary classroom training 
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when using expected employment duration as a measure of success. However, this comes with a 
decline in wages of more than 6 percent.  
 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
These surprisingly consistent negative hourly wage rate effects may have different reasons. Firstly, 
in the way we have specified our wage equation nothing allows us to identify ‘obsolete’ human 
capital, and we equate the value of accumulated labor market experience prior to participation 
among trained with the value of experience among non-participants. But if participants end up 
taking one of the four types of training because of such depreciations of the value of their pre-
training accumulated human capital, then we will clearly underestimate the effect of training on 
hourly wages. Another explanation could be that of a stigmatizing effect. We evaluate the effects of 
the programs in a period where they were a rather new tool used in the Danish economy. Hence, 
employers may have a (potentially false) common belief about these newly introduced programs. 
That is, having participated in any kind of government (co-)sponsored training program could be 
perceived to be nothing but a signal of lower-than-average productivity. In that case the average 
wage rate would come out lower. Even among the firms that took in the unemployed for job 
training there is no reason to offer higher wages once the training is over, since the revealed 
productivity of the newly trained is only available to the firm and therefore carries no outside value 
to the participant. Some participants may trade-off the expected lower hourly wage rate with an 
expected improved employment outlook resulting in an overall increase in earnings as a 
consequence of participation.13 However, we should also note that the explanation of a stigmatizing 
                                                 
13 In a parallel study we evaluate long-run effects of these programs on earnings and employment outcomes, and we 
actually do find an overall positive earnings effect for all programs, see Jespersen et al. (2006). 
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effect has an intrinsic asymmetric information problem in explaining why the unemployed should 
value these programs14 and self-select into them from very early on in their spells (recall Figure 1) 
on the one hand, and the employers not valuing participation on the other hand. See Gerfin et al. 
(2005) for elaborate discussions of further issues connecting heterogeneity in results with 
theoretical arguments. 
 
4.6 Sensitivity with respect to specifications 
 
Our full blown model includes several hundred parameters and, as explained in section 3, 128 mass 
points in the unobservables distribution. It should be evident that, given our dataset, the 
computational burden involved in estimating this model renders extensive sensitivity analysis 
almost impossible. However, we did implement a number of alternative specification checks. 
 
With respect to observables, we estimated the model with experience discretized. The results of the 
treatment effects were completely innocuous to the changes. The UI seniority variable was not 
included in the initial estimations. Recall, that this variable to a large extent captures information of 
previous labor market dynamics, because of the way it is constructed; see section 2. Its inclusion 
changed the estimated coefficients towards zero – in some instances even dramatically. This 
indicates that information on previous durations and labor market attachments in general is crucial. 
This would be in full accordance with Gerfin & Lechner (2002) where alignment of labor market 
histories among treated and controls take place in multiple dimensions. 
 
                                                 
14 Besides the possibility of a pure consumption motive behind participation and the fact that the two OJT programs 
lead to substantial increases in earnings while the program took place, see section 2. 
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The model was estimated initially without the unobservables being correlated across states. Not 
surprisingly did the introduction of correlation of the unobservables matter for the coefficients of 
the treatment indicators. We should also note that in the estimating procedure many of the 128 
combinations of the unobserved components were estimated to be either numerically zero or with 
very low t-statistics. As we tested the model down and eliminated many of the potential types the 
results on the treatment indicator did not change. 
 
Clearly, from the way our model is specified, there is the risk of an overdependence of results with 
respect to functional forms. However, the known instability and problems of identifying both the 
piecewise constant hazards and the points of support in mixing distribution are presumably 
alleviated to some extent by the presence of multiple spells. If the unobservables are fixed across 
spells for the same individual, this multiple spell feature of our data should greatly facilitate 
identification of the mixing distribution. For a discussion of the advantages of multiple spells in a 
recent application of a mixed proportional hazard model, see e.g. Abbring et al. (2005). 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The results of this paper highlight the relevance of not just considering effects of ALMP 
participation on the duration of unemployment, which has been the usual approach in the literature 
evaluating training programs using duration models. Treatment effects on subsequent employment 
duration and wages should preferably also be taken into account, since these effects as illustrated 
here can be more important and unambiguous than the effects on unemployment duration when 
evaluating labor market training programs.  
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Concerning the impact of training on expected duration of unemployment we typically find 
evidence of locking-in effects. That is, while participating in programs, the unemployed are likely 
to reduce their effort to find a regular job. This effect is sometimes counteracted by positive post-
program effects, but overall the programs largely do not have quantitatively important effects on 
unemployment duration. It is hardly surprising that training is found to take time! However, 
concerning effects on the duration of subsequent employment there is a clear prolonging impact for 
participants in private job training and the residual group of training programs, while the opposite is 
true for participants in public job training. The effect of ALMP participation on the hourly wage 
rate is also relatively unambiguous; typically wages are reduced by 3-7 percent. We do not estimate 
the effect of training participation on labor market earnings, however, so it is quite possible that 
these actually increase as a consequence of the training; i.e. it is possible that the increase in 
employability is large enough to more that offset the decrease found in hourly wages for some of 
the subgroups and training schemes. 
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Private On-th-Job Training 14 10 9 8 7 6
Public On-the-Job Training 31 19 19 15 16 15
Ordinary Classroom Training 30 46 44 55 59 65
Individual Job Training 8 4 8 7 5 6
Specially Designed Education 8 6 5 4 4 2
Specially Designed Programs 2 4 3 3 3 3
Employment Programs 0 7 8 7 5 1
Other Programs 7 4 4 1 1 2
  person in each year is used.
TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF PROGRAMS
The treated UI recipients distribution across programs, 1995-2000, percentage points a
a The group considered are unemployed wiht an UI in the age between 19 and 66, and only the first program for each
Private On-th-Job Training 22
Public On-the-Job Training 39
Ordinary Classroom Training 28
Residual Programs 56
  19 and 66, and only the first program for each person is used.
DURATION OF PROGRAMS
TABLE 2
Average duration of programs inititated in 1996, weeksa
aThe group considered are unemployed with an UI in the age between
Private Public Ordinary Residual
OJT OJT CT Programsb
Age, years 36 39 38 35
Female 0,47 0,66 0,62 0,52
Married 0,42 0,49 0,49 0,39
Children below age of six 0,26 0,29 0,29 0,29
Non-OECD citizenship 0,01 0,03 0,04 0,04
Experience, 0-4 years 0,39 0,47 0,43 0,57
Experience, 5-9 years 0,32 0,31 0,29 0,28
Experience, 10+ years 0,29 0,23 0,27 0,18
Elementary education 0,40 0,50 0,41 0,49
Vocational education 0,44 0,35 0,36 0,32
High school education 0,05 0,05 0,08 0,08
College and beyond 0,11 0,10 0,15 0,12
Member of union 0,78 0,84 0,82 0,74
UI replacement rate 0,81 0,85 0,83 0,82
  66, and only the first program in the period 1995-2000 for each person is accounted for.
bThe group of residual programs consists of all programs apart from private and public
  on-the-job training, and ordinary classroom training, see table 1.
TABLE 3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR PARTICIPANTS IN THE DIFFERENT PROGRAMS
Variablesa
aThe group considered are unemployed members of UI funds in the age betweeen 19 and
Sub Group
During After During After During After During After
Men 0,900 0,724 0,319 0,737 0,508 1,126 0,289 0,657
(0,073) (0,025) (0,024) (0,020) (0,018) (0,025) (0,018) (0,019)
Women 1,144 0,830 0,338 0,858 0,485 1,497 0,303 0,765
(0,116) (0,032) (0,019) (0,018) (0,016) (0,030) (0,020) (0,021)
Age below 25 1,017 0,793 0,285 0,877 0,327 0,883 0,418 0,816
(0,183) (0,042) (0,044) (0,052) (0,021) (0,046) (0,047) (0,030)
Age 25 to 29 1,487 0,912 0,457 0,829 0,248 0,954 0,314 0,722
(0,239) (0,052) (0,058) (0,037) (0,013) (0,034) (0,036) (0,040)
Age 30 to 39 1,361 0,865 0,523 0,924 0,295 1,006 0,385 0,772
(0,167) (0,047) (0,045) (0,031) (0,013) (0,027) (0,036) (0,034)
Age 40 to 49 1,260 0,696 0,550 0,868 0,334 0,967 0,449 0,943
(0,197) (0,056) (0,053) (0,036) (0,019) (0,031) (0,048) (0,050)
Age above 49 1,499 0,871 0,390 1,035 0,614 1,375 0,509 0,843
(0,251) (0,121) (0,045) (0,055) (0,045) (0,063) (0,074) (0,089)
Basic Schooling 1,662 0,930 0,495 0,927 0,369 0,968 0,459 0,804
(0,157) (0,045) (0,034) (0,026) (0,014) (0,024) (0,033) (0,027)
High School 1,631 0,929 0,480 0,880 0,244 1,042 0,330 0,757
(0,909) (0,094) (0,120) (0,087) (0,021) (0,064) (0,059) (0,057)
Vocational 1,534 0,832 0,464 0,903 0,323 1,009 0,411 0,845
(0,151) (0,040) (0,035) (0,030) (0,013) (0,026) (0,034) (0,034)
College and 1,545 0,966 0,516 0,980 0,285 1,007 0,368 0,892
Beyond (0,385) (0,120) (0,079) (0,055) (0,018) (0,040) (0,054) (0,072)
aAsymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Bold numbers are statistically different from 1 at a 5 percent level.
Job Training Job Training Classroom Training Programs
TABLE 4
PROPORTIONAL CHANGE IN HAZARD FROM UNEMPLOYMENT INTO EMPLOYMENT DUE TO PROGRAM PARTICIPATION,
 1995-2000a
Private Public Ordinary Residual 
Subgroup Outcome E(Y0)
   Menb Unemployment 39 34 [4*] 53 [16*] 64 [2**] 46 [18*]
           Employment 177 157 [21*] 136 [-20*] 152 [-1] 166 [-2]
(47,382)
   Womenb Unemployment 46 40 [2*] 51 [14*] 83 [-8**] 47 [19*]
Employment 197 173 [21*] 161 [-9*] 162 [2] 181 [6*]
(54,881)
   Age below 25c Unemployment 21 45 [3*] 51 [15*] 31 [6*] 41 [12*]
Employment 182 170 [16*] 138 [-5] 139 [21*] 168 [0]
(1,7867)
   Age 25 to 29d Unemployment 24 65 [-4*] 71 [13*] 43 [7*] 66 [20*]
Employment 209 194 [4] 177 [-26*] 178 [-5] 170 [-3]
(26,512)
   Age 30 to 39e Unemployment 32 60 [0**] 74 [7*] 50 [6*] 77 [19*]
Employment 195 196 [8*] 187 [-22*] 176 [-3] 188 [-4]
(36,567)
   Age 40 to 49b Unemployment 59 51 [5*] 92 [13*] 59 [7*] 89 [14*]
Employment 175 121 [37*] 164 [-16*] 161 [-3] 182 [12*]
(22,882)
   Age above 49f Unemployment 88 96 [-4*] 124 [13*] 117 [-10**] 110 [24*]
Employment 145 139 [82*] 143 [34*] 127 [30*] 145 [85*]
(18,941)
   Basic Schoolingb Unemployment 43 64 [-1] 80 [17*] 76 [1*] 69 [14*]
Employment 197 163 [19*] 147 [-14*] 134 [7*] 173 [6]
(36,491)
   High Schoolb Unemployment 47 58 [-3] 68 [11*] 47 [5*] 51 [15*]
Employment 167 204 [-7] 169 [-3] 181 [12] 190 [-2]
(7,799)
   Vocationalb Unemployment 44 72 [-7**] 78 [13*] 54 [7*] 69 [18*]
Employment 195 162 [21*] 162 [-19*] 165 [-5] 176 [8]
(42,073)
   College and beyondb Unemployment 40 64 [-4] 82 [9*] 49 [12*] 68 [17*]
Employment 174 230 [7*] 174 [-6] 180 [2] 198 [17*]
(18,488)
aNumber in parentheses below estimates are respective sample sizes. Average duration and starting dates are used for the different
 programs, i.e. private job training starts after 29 weeks of open unemployment and lasts for 25 weeks, public job training starts
 after 31 weeks and lasts 34 weeks, ordinary education starts after 30 weeks and lasts 23 weeks, and the residual program starts
TABLE 5
EXPECTED UNEMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT DURATIONS
Weeksa
Private
OJT
(607)
(1,512)
eas b but with 15 years of experience.
fas b but with 25 years of experience.
 after 30 weeks and lasts for 44 weeks. * significant effect at 5% level. ** denotes locking-in effect, but positive post program
bCalculations of average duration based on a person who starts the u spell in 1998, has no children, unmarried, between 40 and
 49 years old, a Danish citizen, residing in a larger city, has 20 years of labor market experience, with vocational education,
 receives 0.80 in UI compensation, had 35 remaining weeks of UI benefits when the spell commenced, and works in metal. See
 text for calculations of average baselines among treated.
cas b but with 5 years of experience.
das b but with 8 years of experience.
(532)
(166)
(234)
(357)
(223)
(159)
(453)
(59)
(495)
(127)
E(Y0|d=m)  [ E(Ym-Y0|d=m) ]
(1,006)
(1,989)
(274)
(475)
(898)
(696)
(650)
(145)
(1,036)
(275)
Public
OJT
Ordinary
CT
Residual
Programs
(370)(1,531)
(3,816) (1,012)
(244)(779)
(4,369) (1,550)
(389)(2,055)
(2,347) (671)
(3,204) (1,038)
(599)(1,881)
(1,099) (503)
(3,976)
(6,600)
(1,550)
(1,649)
Private Public Ordinary Residual 
OJT OJT CT Programs
Men -0,072 -0,078 -0,048 -0,054
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Women -0,028 -0,032 -0,028 -0,035
(0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Age below 25 -0,034 -0,017 -0,062 -0,045
(0,017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.011)
Age 25 to 29 -0,051 -0,057 -0,024 -0,033
(0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Age 30 to 39 -0,056 -0,058 -0,043 -0,042
(0.015) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
Age 40 to 49 -0,029 -0,050 -0,026 -0,064
(0.019) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013)
Age above 49 -0,093 -0,027 -0,034 -0,047
(0.022) (0.014) (0.013) (0.021)
Basic Schooling -0,048 -0,043 -0,035 -0,048
(0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
High School -0,004 -0,072 -0,033 -0,017
(0.031) (0.025) (0.018) (0.021)
Vocational -0,034 -0,047 -0,033 -0,028
(0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
College and beyond -0,092 -0,067 -0,041 -0,027
(0.023) (0.014) (0.012) (0.017)
aAsymptotic standard errors appear in parentheses.
TABLE 6
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN HOURLY WAGE RATE DUE TO PROGRAM PARTICIPATION,
1995-2000a
Sub Group
Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier estimates of weekly hazards into training from
unemployment (left) and (open) unemployment survivor function (right) based on 
170,513 spells of unemployment
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Figure 2: potential effects of training participation on unemployment hazard. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
